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Edward Lorenz* 
Promoting Workplace Participation:  
Lessons from Germany and France** 
 
Recent surveys of workplace participation in the United States point to an 
ostensible paradox. Despite evidence that actively involving workers in shop-level 
decision-making can lead to significant and long-lasting improvements in 
productivity, only a small fraction of US companies have seen fit to confer 
meaningful participatory rights on their workers. This outcome may expose a 
systematic bias of the market against firms adopting participatory work organization, 
and a number of observers have argued in favor of external mandating of workplace 
participation on the grounds of market failure. Based on the comparative experience 
of Germany and France with mandated participation, I argue an equally important 
matter is how the wider industrial relations environment and the strategic choices of 
unions and employers impact on the effectiveness of legislation. 
 
Aktuelle Untersuchungen zur Partizipation am Arbeitsplatz in the Vereinigten 
Staaten weisen auf eine scheinbare Paradoxie hin. Obwohl es offensichtlich ist, daß 
die aktive Beteiligung von Arbeitern an unternehmerischen Entscheidungsprozessen 
zu bedeutenden und langanhaltenden Verbesserungen in der Produktivität führen 
kann, hat sich nur eine geringe Anzahl von US Firmen als fähig erwiesen, 
bedeutungsvolle Beteiligungsrechte auf ihre Arbeiter zu übertragen. Dieses Ergebnis 
mag ein systematisches Vorurteil des Marktes gegen Firmen darstellen, die eine 
partizipatorische Arbeitsorganisation annehmen, und eine Reihe von Beobachtern 
hat sich zugunsten einer externen Verwaltung von Partizipation am Arbeitsplatz 
aufgrund eines Marktversagens ausgesprochen. Basierend auf der komparativen 
Erfahrung von Deutschland und Frankreich mit Mandatspartizipation, argumentiere 
ich, daß es gleichermaßen wichtige Frage ist, welche Auswirkung die weitere 
Umgebung der industriellen Beziehungen und die strategischen Wahlmöglichkeiten 
der Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeber auf die Effektivität der Gesetzgebung haben. 
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The profuse literature in the United States on worker participation in company 
decision-making is not difficult to account for.1 There is a widespread perception that 
American companies are responding to the competitive challenge of Japanese and 
European manufacturers by experimenting with profound changes in the way they 
administer work. In a reversal of historical tendencies towards increased hierarchy 
and centralized control, American firms are trying out more decentralized systems of 
administration in which workers actively participate in decision-making. 
A number of studies have attempted to measure the effects of workplace 
participation on enterprise productivity. In a recent review of the US literature, 
Levine and Tyson (1990) concluded that although participation usually leads to small 
short-run positive effects, it sometimes leads to long-lasting significant improvements 
in productivity. This latter outcome is more likely to be the case when participation 
takes the form of decentralizing decision-making rights to workers in their daily 
production activities on the shopfloor,2 and when the firm's system of industrial 
relations increases workers' confidence that they will share in the gains from 
participation and that they will not be penalized for their participation. The key 
characteristics of such an industrial relations environment are: combining 
participation with some system of profit-sharing or gain-sharing; providing workers 
with job security to increase their time horizons; assuring individual rights in the 
form of due process dismissal procedures; and compressed wage differentials to 
encourage group cohesiveness and a sense of community.3 
Despite the evidence of potential productivity gains from participation, it is clear 
from the results of surveys and from the case study literature that only a small 
fraction of US firms that have introduced substantial forms of workplace participation 
in the sense of Levine and Tyson. The survey evidence, which for the most part is 
limited to larger firms (over 1000 employees), indicates that well over 50 per cent of 
American firms have introduced at least one employee involvement practice 
somewhere in the firm.4 Only a few firms, however, involve more than a small 
                                                          
1 For a recent and fairly comprehensive survey, see Levine and Tyson (1990). 
2  Also see the review of the literature by Eaton and Voos (1992), which concludes that self-
directed teams are more likely to have long-lasting positive effects on productivity than 
quality circles, operating parallel to the work process, or purely financial based incentive 
schemes such as employee stock ownership. This potential benefits of decentralized 
participation is supported by evidence of Womak et al. (1990) on the superior productivity in 
the auto industry of the "lean" production model which decentralizes decision-making to work 
groups at the shop level to assure quick responses to unanticipated changes in demand and to 
draw on their "local" knowledge to improve the firm's capacity for product and process 
innovation. 
3  Levine and Tyson (1990, pp. 205-15). In support of this latter feature, the authors' cite 
empirical studies indicating a tendency of Japanese firms to pay relatively egalitarian wages 
compared to their less participatory US counterparts. See Vogel (1979) and Ouchi (1981). 
4  For an overview of the survey evidence, see Appelbaum and Batt (1994, Appendix A). The 
response rates to these surveys are typically under 50 per cent and the estimates of the 
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percentage of their workers in such practices. The Lawler, Mahrman and Ledford 
1990 survey of the practices of Fortune 1000 firms, for example, showed that while 
66 per cent of all firms operated quality circles, in 70 per cent of these cases less that 
20 per cent of the workforce was involved in the practice. Similarly, while 47 per 
cent of all firms operated self-managed teams, in 90 per cent of these cases less that 
20 per cent of the workforce was involved in team methods. 
A recent overview by Appelbaum and Batt (1994, pp. 69-97) of some 160 case 
studies of work reorganization undertaken by American firms, for the most part in the 
1970s and 1980s, confirms that in the large majority of cases modest changes have 
been introduced, affecting a small proportion of their workforce.5 Their overview also 
points to the non-uniform nature of the reforms instituted across firms, and to the 
tendency of most firms to introduce particular innovations, such as quality circles, 
team organization or a new compensation method, separately rather than as part of an 
integrated program of reform.6 A review of the case study evidence also makes clear 
that a certain caution is needed in interpreting the survey evidence for the simple 
reason that the concept of team organization is used in some firms to refer to purely 
consultative arrangements, such as quality circles operating parallel to the work 
process, and in other firms to refer to increased decision-making autonomy of 
workers in their daily production activities (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994, pp. 69-73). 
The limited diffusion of substantial forms worker participation in the legally 
voluntarist environment of the United States, despite the evidence that such changes 
can improve enterprise productivity, has led a number of observers to conclude that 
instituting effective workplace participation requires legislative intervention 
(Freeman and Lazear 1992; Freeman and Rodgers, 1992; Levine and Tyson, 1990; 
Turner, 1994). This conclusion has been bolstered by reference to the comparatively 
participatory nature of work relations in German manufacturing plants, where 
workers' rights to consultation and co-decision are protected by the Works 
Constitution Acts of 1952 and 1972. The German system of mandated works councils 
is increasingly being presented as a model for workplace reform in the US (Soskice, 
1991; Turner, 1992; Weaver and Allen, 1992). 
Comparatively little attention has been paid in the English language literature to 
the less successful efforts of the French government to mandate direct forms of 
participation at the shop level through the 1982 Auroux Laws.7 Survey and case study 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
percentage of firms introducing employee involvement practices are likely to be upward 
biased since those firms undertaking significant changes are more likely to respond. 
5  Their assessment is based mainly on a series of case studies undertaken by the American 
Productivity and Quality Center in Houston and by the US Department of Labor's Bureau of 
Labor-Management Relations. 
6  Notable exceptions to this latter tendency include: Xerox, GM's Saturn plant and Corning. 
See Appelbaum and Batt (1994, pp. 135-45). 
7  For a notable exception, see Marsden (1994) 
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evidence support an emerging consensus in the French literature that this legislation 
has had disappointingly little impact on how labor is managed in French firms.8  
Based on the comparative experience of Germany and France with mandated 
participation, I argue below that more is at stake in the debate around legislative 
intervention than the question of whether employers, if left to their own devices, will 
confer meaningful participatory rights on their employees. An equally important issue 
is the impact of the strategic choices of unions and employers on the effectiveness of 
such legislation. In an attempt to persuade the reader of this point, I shall begin by 
presenting some plausible arguments in support of the view that employers will not 
voluntarily introduce forms of participation that confer substantial decision- making 
authority on their employees. I then turn to an analysis of selective aspects of the 
French and German experience with legislating workplace participation. 
Arguments For and Against Legislative Intervention 
The most commonly-heard argument against the need for legislative intervention 
is that if workplace participation significantly improves enterprise productivity, then 
competitive market forces will assure its progressive diffusion through-out the 
economy. Those firms adopting such reforms will prosper, while those firms failing 
to do so will pay the price in the form of lower earnings and ultimate closure. 
Against this faith in the efficacy of market forces, Levine and Tyson (1990, pp. 
215-219) have proposed a number of reasons why the market may be systematically 
biased against firms adopting participatory work organization. Their argument 
revolves around the distinction between two alternative strategies employers may 
adopt to motivate their workers: a "participatory" strategy based on job security, 
individual rights and compressed wage differentials; and a "hierarchical" strategy 
based on the threat of dismissal and large wage and status differentials. Although the 
outcome where all firms use the participatory strategy is collectively superior to the 
outcome where all firms use the hierarchical strategy, the emergence and survival of 
the participatory firm may nevertheless be prejudiced by product market and labor 
market conditions.  
At the level of the product market, the hierarchical firm responds to conditions 
of recession by laying-off workers to reduce costs while the participatory firm's 
commitment to long-term employment relations means that it will have to bear the 
costs of hoarding excess labor during periods of low aggregate demand. Since the use 
of layoffs will have a negative feedback effect on the macro-economy through the 
lower consumer expenditures of the unemployed, recessions will tend to be longer 
and deeper than in the case where all firms are of the participatory type and practice 
job security. The increased costs of hoarding excess labor which the participatory 
                                                          
8  For an overview of this literature, see Tchobanian (1992, pp. 104-115) A 1992 Ministry of 
Labor sponsored survey based on a representative sample of 3000 firms with 50 or more 
employees indicated that only 29 per cent were operating workers' direct expression groups as 
called for in the legislation (DARES, Ministère du Travail, 1994, p. 3). 
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firm endures in an economy composed overwhelmingly of hierarchical companies 
will encourage it to abandon its commitment to employment security and adopt the 
hierarchical norm (Levine and Tyson, 1990, pp. 214-15). 
At the level of the labor market, the hierarchical firm's use of steep wage 
differentials tied to individual effort may allow it to poach the participatory firm's 
most productive workers, whose earnings are constrained by the participatory 
strategy of relatively compressed wage differentials. Further, the participatory firm 
may face a problem of adverse selection in the form of attracting the least motivated 
workers in the local labor market, who are attracted by the participatory firm's group-
based compensation schemes and the protection against possible discharge afforded 
by its due process dismissal procedures (Levine and Tyson, 1990, pp. 215-219). 
While the analysis of Levine and Tyson offers some plausible reasons why 
employers, left to their own devices, may under-invest in superior work organization 
based on decentralized decision-making, it would nevertheless be hasty to conclude 
that legislation offers a ready solution to this failure of the market.9 Legislation faces 
two formidable problems. First, in so far as we accept the view that participation is 
more likely to have a long-lasting positive impact on enterprise performance if it 
entails a decentralization of decision-making rights to the shop level, the problem of 
finding the language to spell out the rights and obligations of labor and management 
would seem to be insurmountable for reasons of complexity and uncertainty. 
Decentralized participation takes forms that are highly specific to individual plants 
and work groups, and its effectiveness depends, amongst other things, upon workers 
making quick autonomous responses to what Aoki (1988, pp. 32-43) calls "local 
shocks", such as unanticipated machine breakdowns or absenteeism. It is difficult to 
see how any piece of legislation might hope to spell out obligations in this area in any 
but the most general terms.  
Second, there is the equally formidable problem of enforcement. The promise of 
decentralized participation is that the firm's capacity for process and product 
innovation will be enhanced through workers sharing their proprietary information 
with management. But, as Levine and Tyson (1990, pp. 205-11) have observed, 
workers are unlikely to commit themselves to this process unless they are reasonably 
confident that they will receive a just share in the gains from participation and will 
not be penalized for their participation. It is difficult to see how the state might hope 
efficaciously to enforce obligations in this area, since in general it lacks the 
information to adjudicate disputes between labor and management over the value of 
workers' participation. 
The strongest rejoinder to this critique, in my opinion, is one that accepts the 
basic point that legislation cannot hope to be especially detailed or prescriptive as 
regards decentralized participation. Rather than arguing the virtues of more precise 
language or steeper penalties to enforce compliance, a more convincing comeback is 
that legislation can promote decentralized participation by vesting in a representative 
                                                          
9  For further arguments in favor of external mandating of works councils, see Smith (1991). 
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plant-level works council or local union the right to negotiate agreements with 
management for the introduction of participation at the shop level.10  
Such a procedure arguably responds to the problems raised above. First, while 
the state in general lacks the sort of detailed local information required to negotiate 
agreements that take into account the particularities of individual plants and 
workshops, elected representatives of a works council or local union representatives 
are likely to have this information. Second, a local union or works council, through 
its privileged access to workers involved in participatory practices, is in a position to 
monitor compliance with the requirements of local participation. This implies that 
legislation should provide for a plant-level due process procedure whereby a works 
council or local union can represent workers who feel their rights have been abused 
under the terms of the agreement for shop-level participation. 
In the US, some empirical support for the view that collective representatives of 
the workforce may support decentralized participation comes from recent surveys, 
carried out by Eaton and Voos (1992) and by Kelly and Harrison (1992), comparing 
union and non-union manufacturing facilities. Their studies indicate that 
decentralized participation is more likely to be long-lasting and to take substantial 
forms such as team work when it is negotiated and monitored by a joint union-
management committee. 
From an internationally comparative perspective, probably the strongest 
empirical support for the view that collective workers' representation may support 
decentralized participation comes from recent studies of work reorganization in the 
German auto industry.11 Turner and Auer (1994), in their comparative study of the 
German and US auto industries, have described how from the mid-1980s works 
councils negotiated the introduction of group work in German auto plants.12 IG 
Metall, the national German metal-workers union, has played an active role in this 
process, promoting the introduction of its group work concepts through its members 
which dominate plant-level works councils in the auto industry.13 The result, 
according to Turner, is that the range of outcomes is relatively narrow in comparison 
to the US auto industry, where the initiative for decentralized work organization has 
                                                          
10  This argument has been articulated by Eaton and Voos (1992) and by Streeck (1994).  
11  It is worth noting that there is little evidence for Germany to support the view that instituting 
collective worker representation alone has a significant positive effect on enterprise 
productivity. For a discussion of the empirical literature, see Addison et al. (1994).  
12  Also see Turner (1991 and 1992). 
13  Some of the elements of IG Metall's conception of group work correspond closely to the 
industrial relations system features which Levine and Tyson argue promote effective 
participation. These include: 1) equal pay for all group members; 2) equal opportunity for all 
including special training where necessary; 3) representation of group interests within the 
established plant system of interest representation; 4) a joint steering committee with equal 
labor and management representatives to oversee the operation of the groups. See Turner and 
Auer (1994, p. 48). 
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come from management and where the local union response has ranged from 
cooperation to opposition.14  
The negotiated introduction of group work in the German auto industry supports 
the view that legislation can indirectly promote shop-level participation through the 
agency of the works council. The ability of the works council fulfill this function and 
to promote a particular conception of decentralized participation has been dependent 
on the active support of the external union, IG Metall, which has provided 
information and training to works councilors, increasing their competency in matters 
of group work. Clearly, as a number of observers have pointed out,15 in the German 
metal-working sector underlying the legal fiction of a separation of the rights and 
obligations of works councils and unions is the reality of their mutual support and 
close connection.  
Given the extent to which union policy can impact on the capabilities and 
choices of the works council, one can scarcely afford to avoid posing the question: 
What are the likely outcomes when the works council lacks the external support of a 
strong participation-minded union or is dominated by union members who are 
opposed to the basic project of workplace participation? Will the works council's 
ability to contribute to an increase in the size of the enterprise surplus be undermined 
by conflicts over its distribution? This latter possibility is the subject of an interesting 
analysis of works councils by Freeman and Lazear (forthcoming) which I turn to in 
the following section. 
Works Councils and Distributional Conflict 
Freeman and Lazear's (forthcoming) analysis of the productivity effects of 
works councils turns on the distinction between what is socially optimal and what 
serves to optimize labor's and management's respective shares of the enterprise 
surplus or quasi-rents.16 While granting workers co-decision rights through a works 
council tends to increase the size of the enterprise surplus, it also shifts the 
distribution of that surplus in favor of workers. According to Freeman and Lazear, 
conferring the amount of power on the works council that maximizes the joint surplus 
has a proportionately larger negative impact on management's share of the joint 
surplus, and for this reason management will eschew works councils or grant them a 
less than socially optimal amount of decision-making power. Workers, on the other 
hand, seek a more than socially optimal amount of decision making authority for the 
works council, since the redistribution on the surplus in their favor that results from 
                                                          
14  For further evidence and discussion of the active role of IG Metall in the process of work 
reorganization in the German auto industry, see Jansen and Kissler (1994); Rehfeldt (1991); 
and Streeck (1987).  
15  See notably Streeck (1984), Thelen (1991) and Wever (1994). 
16  Quasi-rents are defined as the difference between the value of firm output and the opportunity 
costs of producing that output or, in other words, the surplus available for distribution among 
employees and shareholders. 
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this increase in works council power will more than offset the negative effect on their 
incomes due to a decline in the total surplus available for distribution. 
The analysis of Freeman and Lazear can be criticized for their failure to justify 
the assumption that the distribution of quasi-rents is tied in such a precisely 
determinant manner to the amount of decision-making power conferred on the works 
council.17 For the purposes of this paper, though, the importance of their argument is 
that it justifies our intuition that distributional conflict may interfere with the ability 
of the works council to fulfill its assigned role in fostering participation.  
The basic response to this problem in the US literature is that legislation should 
as much as possible restrict the determination of pay and other elements of 
compensation to the collective bargaining process outside the enterprise, and in this 
manner disconnect the factors which determine the size of the enterprise surplus from 
the factors that determine its distribution between labor and management. In practice, 
as Freeman and Lazear (forthcoming) readily admit, completely separating these 
factors is not likely to be feasible. Consider the case of German works councils. 
Although they are legally prohibited from going on strike, by strategically using their 
powers of co-determination to withhold their agreement on key issues of manpower 
planning they are in a position to pressure management into increasing workers' share 
of the enterprise surplus. It is well known that the practice of works councils signing 
plant-level wage agreements providing for upward wage flexibility over rates 
negotiated at the regional level is widespread, despite the fact that the 1952 and 1972 
Works Constitution Acts expressly prohibit the works council from negotiating 
agreements on subjects regulated by collective bargaining.18 
One cannot realistically hope to dissociate entirely decision-making power in the 
firm from the power to determine who receives profits, and if labor (through the 
union and works council) and employers succeed in Germany in jointly promoting 
the forms of decentralized participation that increase the size of the enterprise pie, 
this occurs because each side believes they stand to gain from such shop-level 
cooperation. But such beliefs can hardly be divorced from the wider industrial 
relations environment in Germany and from the mutual trust that has been built-up 
between unions and employers over the post-World War II years through the union's 
regular participation in enterprise manpower planning via its position in the works 
                                                          
17 A paradoxical feature of their account is that while there is a possible outcome in which 
participation is socially beneficial and generates positive benefits for all, labor and 
management are unable achieve this outcome. Yet presumably, as implied by the Coase 
theorem, workers would have an incentive to bind themselves to respecting an ex-post 
distribution of the enterprise surplus that would leave management at least as well off as they 
were prior to the introduction of the work council, if that were the condition for having any 
participation at all. 
18 See, for example, Mathöffer (1994). According to Thelen (1991, p. 82) the difference between 
regionally negotiated rates and actual wages in the metal-working sector averaged 22.5 per 
cent during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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council, and through the usual practice of collective bargaining between unions and 
employers outside the firm. 
I will provide some evidence on the post-World War II development of German 
industrial relations to back-up this claim. But first it will be illuminating to take a 
brief detour and consider the comparatively unsuccessful French efforts to 
legislatively mandate decentralized participation under the terms of the 1982 Auroux 
Laws. The French experience constitutes an exemplar case of how the strategic 
choices of unions and employers can derail well-minded legislation for 
participation.19 
The Lessons of the Auroux Laws 
The Auroux Law of 4 August 1982 called for employers and local union 
representatives (or works councilors in the absence of a local union) in firms with 
200 or more employees to negotiate agreements for the creation of worker expression 
groups which would allow workers to express directly to management suggestions 
over a range of topics, including working conditions and the introduction of new 
technology. Legislation in 1986 extended the coverage of the law to firms with 50 or 
more employees (Bulletin Social Frances Lefebvre, April 1993). The legislation 
corresponds to the kind of scenario identified in the US literature as favoring 
effective worker participation. The French state acted to mandate decentralized 
participation through the intermediary of the local union or works council, rather than 
aspiring to directly determine the conditions of shop-level participation.  
It is important to point out, since there is often ignorance on this matter, that the 
law of 4 August was accompanied by two others that aimed to directly and indirectly 
strengthen the position of trade unions at the enterprise level. The law of 13 
November 1982 required employers and union delegates to engage in annual 
negotiations on wages and working time in firms with more than 50 employees, while 
the law of 28 October 1982 strengthened the economic and technical related 
information and consultation rights of works councilors, the large majority of whom 
were affiliated to a union.20 Key new consultation rights in the economic area include 
the right to the services of an outside accountant whenever the employer proposes to 
make collective layoffs, and the right to hire the services of an outside technical 
                                                          
19 The following discussion of the Auroux Laws is based on Lorenz (1994). 
20 Unlike the 1952 Works Constitution Act in Germany, the 1947 French legislation instituting 
works councils explicitly envisaged this close relation by giving the unions a "monopoly" on 
the presentation of lists of candidates on the first round of voting for works council 
representatives. In 1981-82, approximately 80 per cent of elected works councilors in France 
were union affiliated. The decline in this percentage to about 74 per cent in 1989-90 can be 
explained in large measure by the decline in the percentage of firms where the unions present 
lists of candidates, rather than by an increase in the expressed preference for non-union 
candidates in firms where employees are offered a choice. See Labbé (1992, pp. 52-54). 
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expert whenever the employer plans to introduce new technology.21 The Auroux 
Laws not only conferred new responsibilities on the unions, the legislation also aimed 
to strengthen the organizational resources of the unions at the plant level so that they 
could effectively fulfill their new obligations. 
Between 1982 and 1984, some 4000 agreements were signed concerning 
approximately 2,500,000 employees, and by 1990, following the extension of the 
law's coverage, agreements had been signed in 25,434 plants, or about 50 per cent of 
those covered by the law, and concerned some 4 million employees.22 A 1990 
Ministry of Labor survey estimated, however, that groups were active in only about 
25 per cent of the plants covered by the law, while a 1993 survey based on a 
representative sample of 3000 firms estimated that expression groups were active in 
about 29 per cent of firms (Liaisons Sociales, April, 1993, pp. 1-10; DARES, 
Ministère du Travail, April 1994). 
In addition to achieving only a partial diffusion of decentralized forms of 
participation, most assessments point to some serious problems with the nature of the 
agreements and the way the groups have operated. First, the majority of the 
agreements are restricted to specifying procedures for setting up groups, including 
their composition, how the leader is to be selected and the number of hours of 
discussion per year. They offer little or no guidance on what the content of group 
discussion should be. Second, surveys and case study evidence on the operation of 
expression groups show that in most cases they have served as forums for workers to 
pose questions to or make demands on management, mainly in the area of working 
conditions such as safety and the pace of work. In general they have not functioned as 
a devices for drawing on workers' knowledge and creative ideas on how to improve 
productivity (Coiffineau, 1993; Liaison Sociales, April, 1993; Tchobanian, 1992, pp. 
108-12). 23 
This outcome can be explained in part by the expressed opposition of the 
principal employers' peak associations to the legislation, who feared that the 
expression groups would be used by the unions to advance their sectional interests at 
                                                          
21 The hiring of outside accountants is paid for directly by the employer and, in the case of firms 
with over 300 employees, the hiring of outside technical experts is also paid for directly by 
the employer under the terms of a contract negotiated with the works council. In the case of 
firms with less than 300 employees, these latter expenses are to be met from the works 
council's general budget for economic activities equal to 0.2 per cent of the firm's gross wage 
bill. The evidence available indicates that a small percentage of works council's make use of 
their consultation rights on the introduction of new technology experts. See Cam (1990), 
Harff and Henriet (1988, p. 167) and Le Maitre and Tchobanian (1992).  
22 An absence of a trade union delegate present explains about 58 per cent of the cases where no 
agreement was signed while a failure to agree accounts for some 13 per cent. 
23 Coiffineau (1993) points out that their impact on working conditions has been minor because 
of a general lack of follow-up on group questions or suggestions which has contributed to a 
growing apathy and cynicism on the part of workers. 
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the plant level.24 The Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières (UIMM), the 
peak association of employers in the metal-working industries, actively encouraged 
employers to set up quality circle arrangements operating along side and in direct 
competition with the expression groups.25 A recent French Ministry of Labor 
sponsored survey of a representative sample of 3000 firms with over 50 employees 
has estimated that 23 per cent were operating quality circles in 1990, roughly the 
same percentage as were operating direct expression groups (DARES, Ministère du 
Travail, 1994, p. 3). 
Opposition to the legislation was also expressed at the national level by two of 
the three principle union federations, Force Ouvrière (FO) and the Confédération 
Générale du Travail (CGT), who feared that the direct expression groups would 
weaken local unionism by offering workers alternative forms of representation. At the 
local level, the most principled opposition to the legislation came from 
representatives of FO, who refused to sign some 50 per cent of the agreements that 
were concluded in firms where they had established a local branch. Local 
representatives of the CGT were much more receptive to the negotiations, signing 
about 80 per cent of the agreements that were concluded in the plants where they 
were organized (Tchobanian, 1992, p. 107). The failure of CGT representatives to 
sign was in most cases a response to employer insistence that a member of 
management lead the discussion groups.26 
Unlike FO and the CGT, the other principal union confederation, the 
Confédération Française Democratique du Travail (CFDT), actively championed the 
expression groups and encouraged its local representatives to negotiate agreements 
with management. For this reason, it is significant that even in the case of the CFDT 
local representatives generally adopted a defensive posture in their negotiations with 
management. A recent survey, reported by Tchobanian (1992, pp. 108-115), of the 
attitudes of 100 local trade union representatives of the CFDT who were involved in 
negotiating the introduction of the expression groups indicated that the most common 
tactic was to seek operational procedures which would assure the maximum 
independence of the groups and of the content of workers' expression from 
managerial influence. While, on Tchobanian's account, this approach reflected a 
                                                          
24 For the opposition of the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) to the legislation at 
the time of its passing, see Coiffineau (1993, pp. 16-17). 
25 The only estimates on the number of quality circles operating in France during the 1980s that 
I am aware of are those published by the Association Française des Cercles de Qualité 
(AFCERQ), created under the auspices of the UIMM in 1981 to promote quality circles. 
AFCERQ, which had a clear interest in over-estimating the degree of diffusion claimed in 
1987, two years before its collapse, that some 40,000 quality circles were in operation in 
French firms.  See Chevalier (1994, p. 212). 
26 Employers were quite successful in assuring their control over the direction of the groups. As 
of 1992, 58 per cent of the agreements signed give the employer the right to choose the group 
leader, while only 22 per cent conferred this right on the groups themselves (Coiffineau, 
1993). 
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mistrust of management's intentions, it also was adopted with the idea that the local 
union might strengthen its bargaining position in the firm by actively following-up on 
group demands. In short, the local representatives in most cases perceived the 
expression groups as a strategic resource in their adversarial bargaining relations with 
management. In only a few cases did CFDT representatives seek to use the groups as 
instruments for drawing on workers' creative knowledge for improving production 
methods. In these exceptional cases works council representatives, in making use of 
their enhanced consultation rights over the introduction of new technology, would 
encourage the groups to make preliminary studies which they would draw on before 
expressing an opinion to management (Tchobanian 1992, pp. 108-110). 
The disappointing performance of the direct expression groups in France 
suggests that the attitudes and beliefs of employers and unions can be a serious 
obstacle to the effectiveness of legislation for participation. Unions and employers 
voiced the typical fear that the expression groups would be used as a strategic 
resource by the other side to increase their power and command over resources within 
the firm. In some cases such concerns led to actions designed to thwart the 
legislation, as with the decision of some employers to create quality circles along side 
and in competition with the groups, or with the refusal of some local unions to 
participate in the negotiations. In other instances such mistrust led to defensive 
strategies designed to limit the influence of the other side over the operation of the 
groups. Considerable conflict emerged over the issue of who would have the right to 
lead the groups, to the expense of creative efforts to turn the groups into forums for a 
sincere exchange of information between labor and management. 
It is tempting to draw a pessimistic conclusion from the French experience for 
the possibility of promoting workplace participation through external mandating in 
the United States, a nation similarly marked by a legacy of adversarial industrial 
relations and by widespread opposition of employers to union interference with how 
they manage their workforces. My purpose in highlighting the French experience is 
more nuanced, for if the study of comparative industrial relations points to strong 
inertial forces in the character of labor-management relations, it also makes clear that 
significant change can come about. ln the final section of this paper, I turn to a brief 
acount of the post-World War II evolution of union and employer attitudes on the 
issue of workplace particpation in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is all too easy 
to forget just how far apart the two sides were on the issue of co-determination just 
after the war, and that the institution of effective workplace participation required a 
lengthy process of adaptation and learning. 
Workplace Participation as Institution Building 
In considering the 20th century history of German industrial relations one 
cannot help being struck by the evolution from a sitution of almost internecine 
conflict in the Weimar Republic to one of relative industrial peace after the Second 
World War. This evolution in attitudes and behavior is often presented as a response 
to the tragic events of the interwar period; to a new pragmatism and moderation on 
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the part both unions and employers born of their conviction that the overt conflicts of 
the Weimar Republic contributed to the rise of the Nazi dictatorship. Recent work by 
Berghahn (1986) on the ideology of German employers' after the Second World War 
points to strong elements of continuity with the inter-war period. His account makes 
clear that the more conservative employers, especially in Ruhr heavy industry, 
detested the "Dinklebach" model, which had been established in the British zone in 
1947 and which provided for union-employer parity on the Supervisory boards of 
coal and steel enterprises. Individuals such as Hermann Reusch, the director-general 
of the giant steel producer, Gutehoffnungshütte, and F. Berg, the first president of the 
BDI,27 the peak association concerned with the economic-policy interests of German 
employers, continued to see the situation much as they had during the Weimar 
Republic, as a question of socialism or capitalism with the unions as their implacable 
foes (Berghahn, 1986, pp. 192-93 and 220-230). 
Conversely, if we are to take at face value the statements of the unions at this 
time, their progressive integration into a liberal regime of collective bargaining was 
far from inevitable. At the founding congress of the unions' confederation, the 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), in Munich on 12-14 October 1949, their 
program called for a fundamental transformation of socio-economic relations in 
Germany. The center piece of this was the all encompassing framework of 
Mitbestimmung or the program of power-sharing at all levels of society from the 
shopfloor up through to the public institutions responsible for macro-policy. By the 
mid to late 1950s, though, the DGB and its affiliated unions had all but abandoned 
their social transformative aspirations and were concentrating on improving wages 
and conditions of their members through collective bargaining (Markovits, 1986, pp. 
83-93). 
A factor that arguably reinforced the position of the moderates within the union 
movement at this time was the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government's 
moderate handling of the 1950 strike threat by I.G. Metall, the dominant union in the 
DGB. I.G. Metall threatened strike action in an effort to prevent the introduction of a 
Works Constitution bill that would have eliminated exiting arrangements in coal and 
steel based on the principle of power-sharing through union-employer parity on the 
supervisory boards of companies. Chancellor Adenauer personally mediated this 
conflict and his intervention was instrumental in forging a compromise between 
unions and employers which provided for the separate 1951 Co-determination Act, 
exclusively for iron and steel, which was ratified in advance of the passage of a 
Works Constitution bill for the rest of German industry. This solution was designed 
to appease the employers who would be assured that parity would not be extended 
                                                          
27 The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) holds responsibility for economic and 
commercial policy issues, while a separate peak organization, the Bundesvereinigung der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA), is responsible for social and collective bargaining 
issues. 
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beyond coal and steel and that a less radical Works Constitution bill would be passed 
at a later date (Berghahn and Karsten, 1989, p. 184).28 
The unions' victory in assuring full-parity in coal and steel was shortly to be 
followed by what the DGB perceived as a major political defeat in passage of the 
1952 Works Constitution Act for the rest of German industry. Despite the DGB's 
opposition, the 1952 act contained a number of clauses unacceptable to the unions, 
including provisions for less than workforce parity and no direct union input on the 
Supervisory Boards of companies, and legal restrictions on the union activities of 
works councilors while inside the plant (Markovits, 1986, pp. 80-83).  
In the metal-working sector, the response of IG Metall to this defeat was a 
defensive one designed to neutralize the works councils, which the union feared 
would constitute an alternative non-union form of worker representation.29 From the 
mid-1950s, IG Metall mounted a plant-level drive to create union shop steward 
committees alongside the works councils in order to strengthen the union's position 
and to exercise control over the works councils. The union also pragmatically 
pursued the strategy of actively campaigning to fill the works councils with its own 
members (Thelen, 1991, p. 78). While the history of these efforts goes beyond the 
scope of this essay, it is generally conceded that the shop stewards' campaign failed to 
achieve its aims. According to Streeck (1984, pp. 28-31), the emerging reality during 
1960s was in most cases one of works council domination of the shop stewards. This 
failure helps explain the strategic change in IG Metall's position over the 1960s. 
Rather than aspiring to compete for workers' allegeance through establishing an 
alternative representative to the works council, the union came to see the works 
council as a vehicle for influencing plant level decision making through the active 
participation of its members elected to the councils.30  
On the employers' side there was a similar process of learning and adaptation 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Berghahn (1986), in his detailed account of the evolution 
of employer attitudes after the war, argues that an important factor in this process was 
the role played by the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände 
                                                          
28 It is far from clear that Adenuaer's decision to moderate the conflict rather than push for a 
defeat of the unions was inevitable. German employers were deeply divided on this matter. As 
Berghahn and Karsten note, "the hardliners in industry, who had never reconciled themselves 
to the advances made by the unions after the war and who detested the Dinkelbach model [in 
coal and steel], urged him [Adenauer] to stand firm and not give in to union 'blackmail'" 
(Berhahn and Karsten, 1989, p. 184) Markovits (1986, pp. 78-79) has suggested that 
Adenauer's support for co-determination was based in part on his profound "respect and 
affection" for Hans Bockler, the leader of the DGB, who died unexpectedly just prior to 
passing of the Co-determination Act in April 1951. This remains a controversial 
interpretation, though. 
29 These concerns were justified in the eyes of the unions by a significant fall in their 
membership rates during the 1950s. IG Metall's organization level fell from 56.2 per cent in 
1952 to a low of 37.7 per cent in 1963, after which the trend reversed. See Thelen (1991, p. 
78). 
30 This is a major theme developed by Thelen (1991). 
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(BDA), the peak association responsible for the social welfare and collective 
bargaining interests of German employers. Under the leadership of such moderates as 
G. Erdmann and W. Raymond, the BDA acted as a buffer against the more 
conservative Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), while also playing a 
pedagogic role in urging its regional and branch associations to pursue regular 
collective bargaining with employees and their organizations (Berghahn, 1986, pp. 
230-59).  
A number of studies on the practice of co-determination during the late 1950s 
and 1960s have concluded that the system was making a positive contribution to the 
negotiated resolution of conflict in German companies (Jenkins, 1973; Macbeath, 
1973; Spiro, 1958). At the time of the reemergence of co-determination as a political 
issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s under the Social-Liberal coalition, the 
influential Biedenkopf Commission report of 1970 observed that as a effect of co-
determination the consideration of the social consequences of its decision-making had 
become a standard feature of most German companies.31 But the considerable length 
of time involved in achieving any fundamental change in attitudes is also apparent 
from the reactions of the more conservative industrialists to the prospect of an 
extension of workers' co-determination rights at this time. The BDA and the BDI both 
led vigorous campaigns against any extension of co-determination along the lines of 
full parity. Like an echo from the early 1950s, Berg of the BDI was predicting the end 
of the market economy through the creation of a union state. It was only in the years 
following the passage of the 1972 Works Constitution Act that it could truly be said 
that the balance within the employers' associations had been tipped towards those 
favoring a lasting accommodation with the new realities of workplace participation.32 
Conclusions 
The comparative experience of Germany and France leads to the conclusion that 
legislation may promote the diffusion of effective workplace participation, but it need 
not do so. This is a vague conclusion, but I would contend that it is vague for 
precisely the same reasons that the comparative study of industrial relations policy is 
inescapably a vague undertaking. Any attempt to draw definite conclusions for one 
nation about the consequences of a particular policy measure based upon another 
nation's experience runs up against the problem that wider sets of international 
comparisons point to a diverse range of possible outcomes. The French experience of 
the 1980s provides a corrective to an undeserved faith in the efficacy of legislative 
solutions that an exclusive consideration of the German case might seem to warrant. 
The ultimate value of international comparisons, I would contend, is not in providing 
                                                          
31 See the discussions of the report's findings in Lane (1989, pp. 231-32) and in Thelen (1991, 
pp. 49-50). 
32 See Berghahn (1986, pp. 260-325) for a detailed account of the period. German employers' 
challenge to the constitutionality of the 1976 Co-determination Act does not contradict this. 
This was undertake in an effort to set legal limits to a further extension of co-determination 
rather than to do away with it (Markovits, 1986, pp. 139-40). 
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concrete lessons for how to bring about systemic change in industrial relations 
systems. The effects of any particular policy measure will inevitably depend on 
various contingent factors, specific to the particular nation. Rather, the value of such 
comparisons is in pointing to the range of possible worlds that can be constructed, 
and in opening our imaginations to the possibility of forging new forms of 
cooperation even in situations where the actors may seem to be locked-in to an 
inevitable cycle of conflict and mutual recrimination. 
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